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Abstract: This article is concerned with exploring how working time is regulated and experienced in 
the international food retail sector in the UK and Cyprus. Following Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie 
the article accepts that regulation in employment relations is a multifaceted phenomenon shared by a 
number of competing actors at different institutional levels. The paper highlights the limitations of 
working time regulation in the two countries and argues that employers are increasing their control 
over the timing and allocation of shifts and working time. The paper illustrates how employers 
‘capture’ working time regulation by exercising their prerogative to more closely match working time 
with the exigencies of customer demand. In this environment, the paper reveals how employees are 
experiencing practices such as ‘forced availability’, coupled with pressure to extend working hours as 
well as facing increasing levels of unpredictability as to when they are required to attend AQ4 work. 
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Introduction 
This article is concerned with exploring how working time is regulated and experienced in 
the highly competitive international food retailing sector in two EU countries – the UK and 
Cyprus. Working time across the EU is regulated through the European Working Time 
Directives. The Regulations are enacted in the domestic legislation of member states with 
considerable differences across national boundaries (Boulin et al, 2006). Variations and gaps 
in state intervention imply scope for other actors (i.e. employers, employees and unions) to 
influence and shape the regulation of working time in their own interests.  
To capture the interaction of different employment relations actors shaping the regulation of 
working time in supermarket retail, this paper adopts a theoretical perspective developed by 
Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie (2004 and 2005). This perspective on regulation does not 
privilege one site or actor such as the state in terms of the focus of analysis, but accepts that 
regulation in employment relations is a multifaceted phenomenon shared by a number of 
competing public and private actors at different institutional levels. Moreover, the 
dismantling or absence of state mechanisms does not mean that regulation does not exist, or 
is dormant. Rather, it suggests a shift or a recasting of regulation across different sites and 
between the different actors. These actors include the state, industrial relations institutions, 
such as collective bargaining at sector or firm level and/or unilateral management decision-
making at firm/enterprise level (Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie, 2004: Mackenzie and 
Martinez-Lucio , 2005). Within a ‘regulatory space’ (in this case working time), these actors 
deploy a range of mechanisms, of social control for a multiplicity of different purposes. 
Regulation is thus fluid implying shifts and movement across different sites and boundaries 
(Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie, 2004: Mackenzie and Martinez-Lucio, 2005). 
This article utilizes the Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie framework (2004 and 2005) in several 
ways. Firstly, in the literature section the framework is used to outline how working time 
regulation in the grocery retail sectors of UK and Cyprus is shared by a number of competing 
public and private actors. At the same time, this section argues that employers have become 
more dominant and captured key aspects of working time regulation in the face of inadequate 
legislative protection and weakened unions. In doing so, it highlights how this ‘capture’ by 
employers in the context of recession and competition leads to greater management efforts to 
make working time increasingly flexible. This flexibility in terms of the allocation of working 
time has the effect of undermining terms and conditions of employment of front-line workers 
in the UK and Cyprus retail sectors. The second use of the framework is to empirically 
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explore the implications of this ‘capture’ (Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie, 2004). In 
particular, how employers are introducing new ways to regulate working time, the impact on 
employees and the degree to which these changes are contested. Thirdly, the framework 
recognises that a decline in influence of regulatory actors (e.g. the state or unions) does not 
preclude a reassertion of their role (Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie, 2004). In the light of the 
study’s findings, options for the reorganisation and re-regulation of working time away from 
the enterprise level are explored. 
 The retail supermarket sectors in the UK and Cyprus provide interesting sites of international 
comparison regarding the themes of this paper. This is because although there are differences 
in working time setting regimes, these are narrowing. Similar to the UK, Cyprus is becoming 
a more liberalised economy with increasingly deregulated labour markets (Gialis and 
Leontidou, 2014). Unions and the institutions of collective bargaining in each of the national 
sectors are weak, with diminishing influence of collective agreements in Cyprus, placing 
greater emphasis on enterprise-level decisions. Moreover, each country’s retail sector is 
experiencing shifts in the statutory regulation of working time that directly (Cyprus’s 
extension of Sunday trading) or indirectly (the continuing legality of zero hours contracts in 
the UK) support a climate where employers are given greater discretion and control over 
rostering and scheduling. 
The article begins with the aforementioned literature section. The next section outlines the 
method. The results are then presented from a comparative qualitative study in food retailing. 
The final section presents a discussion of the article’s contribution. This contribution includes 
the key finding that increased employer control over the timing of shifts and rotas leads to the 
phenomenon of ‘forced availability’ for workers in food retail. Such strategies can emerge 
through formal (UK) contractual processes and informal (Cyprus) line management 
behaviour and practices. These employer strategies disrupt home and family life among retail 
workers, causing tensions with the front-line. In Cyprus, these tensions are exacerbated by 
accompanying forced moves from full-time to part-time work, and management flouting 
national and EU-based statutory protections for employees regarding working time. 
The Regulation of Working Time in Food Retail in the UK and Cyprus 
As with other sectors the regulation of working time in food retail is shared by multiple 
competing actors, including the European Union (EU), nation states, collective bargaining 
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institutions and enterprise-level decision-makers. The EU introduced the Working Time 
Regulations to offer some protection for workers’ rights. The aim of these EU measures was 
to introduce limits to working hours and introduce rest breaks on the grounds of health and 
safety (Eurofound, 2016). The measures introduced maximum average 48 hour working 
weeks (based on a 17 week period) over seven days, limits on the hours of night work, a rest 
period of not less than eleven consecutive hours in each 24 hour period, and finally a break of 
not less than 24 hours uninterrupted in a seven day period. Employees whose working time is 
more than six hours in a day, were also entitled to a rest break (Devlin and Shirvani, 2014). 
Responsibility for enacting these measures was passed onto member states leading to 
considerable differences both in the organisation and regulation of working time and in how 
the directives are translated into policy instruments (Boulin, et al, 2006).  
In the UK the Working Time Regulations 1998 (amended 2003) were introduced against a 
background of concerns regarding their potential disruptive impact on the country’s 
deregulated and flexible labour market (Hurrell, 2005). Indeed, costs to the UK economy of 
this form of employee protection were estimated at £1.8 to £2.3bn (Gilman, 1997). As a 
result of such concerns, legislation was applied in what many saw as a minimalistic way, with 
considerable employer derogations (Hurrell, 2005). Most controversially was the ‘Agreement 
to exclude the maximum’ which stipulated that the 48 hour maximum shall not apply in 
relation to a worker who has agreed with her/his employer in writing that it should not apply 
in her/his case. This derogation can relate to a specified period or apply indefinitely. At the 
same time, the agreement can be terminated by the worker by giving not less than seven days' 
notice to his employer in writing (HMSO, 1998). In the UK, this derogation handed 
considerable discretion for employers to influence and regulate individual working time 
arrangements among their workforces at enterprise level.  
In Cyprus, the transposition of EU legislation showed a much more pluralist regulation of 
working time, as the Directive was fully aligned to the provisions of existing collective 
agreements through the Law 63 (I)/2002 Organisation of Working Time (Eurofound, 2016). 
The standard time norm of the working week has been a 38 hour, 5 day week. This is a 
consequence of efforts prior to the 2008 financial crisis to reduce working time through a 
Framework Agreement between employers and unions that aimed for a reduction in working 
hours from 40 to 38 hours. In addition, reductions in overall hours is thought to reflect the 
entry of greater numbers of women into the workforce through part-time work (Eurofound, 
2016). Moreover, in Cyprus, in terms of the length of the working week, retail sales, unlike 
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the rest of the economy (five days per week), were subject to a six day week (EurWORK, 
2009). Prior to the crisis, however, it was the case that under the law, the working week for 
shop workers could not exceed 38 hours or eight hours in a day. There were also stipulations 
regarding overtime compensation for working weekends; rest breaks and free afternoons for 
those working a six day week. These figures indicate relatively low working hours and mean 
the Working Time Directive did not make any significant impact when introduced in Cyprus 
(EurWORK, 2009).  
Beyond the derogations outlined in the above UK legislation, there are weaknesses in the 
protections afforded to workers from the EU’s and the UK and Cyprus’s regulation of 
working time. There are general concerns, for instance, regarding weak enforcement 
mechanisms pertaining to the EU’s working time regulations leading to fears of the growth of 
unregulated overtime across the single market (Eurofound, 2016). Furthermore, the 
regulations do not provide any protection concerning scheduling or rostering of time, leaving 
this aspect in the hands of national governments, and industrial relations institutions and other 
actors. In the majority of member states in the EU, employer power in this regard is mediated 
because the EU’s statutory measures merely set the general framework for further working 
time regulation (including rostering) through collective agreements (Eurofound, 2016).  
In contrast, in the UK, employer discretion over rostering is stronger because unlike other EU 
states, there are very few accompanying sector-level collective negotiations and agreements 
on working time. Therefore, in the UK the regulation of working hours below the 48 hour 
limit is decided almost unilaterally by employers at the enterprise level (Eurofound, 2016).  
Studies in other front-line service occupations reveal how UK employers have used discretion 
over the allocation of working-time to match staffing levels to periods of high demand.  This 
has several consequences most notably; reducing costs by not rewarding work-related time 
periods that are not high or direct customer related, the intensification of work during periods 
of high customer demand (Rubery, et al, 2015), and work (especially part-time) becoming 
increasingly fragmented (Blyton, 2011; Blyton and Jenkins, 2012). In the case of UK retail 
authors have noted that flexible working arrangements, have grown significantly in recent 
years (Allan et al, 2000; Grugulis and Bozkurt 2011).  
Moreover, the rise in the management prerogative following the 2008 financial crisis and 
downturn presented governments and employers in the UK and Cyprus with opportunities to 
further capture working time and introduce more flexible and unpredictable working 
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arrangements under their tutelage (Eurofound, 2016). In the UK, for instance, the lack of 
regulatory protection concerning the scheduling or rostering of working time is illustrated by 
its high proportion of part-time work, standing at 23.7% of the employed labour force in 2015 
(Eurostat, 2017). It is estimated that 77% of private sector employers employed part-time 
workers in 2011 (Wanrooy, et al, 2013). Those working part-time in the UK on average work 
16.2 hours a week (ONS, 2016).  Moreover, there has also been a reported increase in other 
numerical flexibility practices such as proliferation of zero-hour contracts (ZHCs). ZHCs are 
where the employer does not guarantee the employee a minimum number of hours. Studies 
reveal an upward trend in the numbers of workers employed on such contracts (Adams and 
Deakin, 2014). Indeed, retail is reported as employing 11% of its workforce on ZHCs (CIPD, 
2015). The growing presence of ZHCs is seen to be symptomatic of a UK labour market that 
is increasingly dominated by unilateral management prerogative, and characterised by 
demands for ever more employee flexibility, and greater uncertainty for workers regarding 
the scheduling of work. 
Cyprus has been following the path of other Mediterranean EU partners (Greece, Italy and 
Spain) (Gialis and Leontidou, 2014) in pursuing de-/re-regulation trade-offs designed to help 
firms recover from reduced demand in the post-2008 crisis era and help reduce high levels of 
youth unemployment. These trade –offs are achieved through using flexible employment 
strategies. The Mediterranean, EU countries in post-2008 have moved towards introducing 
de-regulatory policies that have allowed employers to introduce labour market flexibility and 
lower levels of employment security. In the former case, this includes flexible working time 
practices, i.e. encouraging part-time employment and atypical employment (Gialis and 
Leontidou, 2014).  
For Cyprus, the country has some way to go compared to the UK in terms of labour market 
flexibility, because of low levels of part-time work. Although the level of part-time work is 
steadily increasing over the years, standing at 12.9% in 2015, is still behind that of the rest of 
the EU28, which currently stands at an average of 19% (Eurostat, 2017). Nevertheless, 
recession and economic crisis are accelerating change. Economic problems have led to 
increasing unemployment, especially for young graduates at 17.5%. Cyprus also had the 
highest increase of unemployment within the Eurozone in 2013. Subsequently, efforts to 
increase employment in Cyprus were made, in parallel with calls from employers’ 
organisations to increase flexibility within the workforce to keep pace with economic change 
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and allow time scheduling to be directly connected to variations in demand (Eurofound, 
2016).  
In retail, in 2013 the Cyprus Government at the peak of the recession, in an attempt to tackle 
increasing unemployment, provided an important revision and ‘trade off’ relating to the 
‘Regulation of the operation of shops and the Employment Terms’. This involved instituting 
an extension of opening hours for employers within the retail sector, extending the working 
week to seven days: following a path in the rest of the EU towards greater Sunday Working 
(Eurofound, 2015). The new regulations specified an extension to the opening hours for retail 
shops, so that they were allowed to remain open between 7am-10pm daily and 9am-9pm on 
Sundays. Previously, they only remained open until 8pm on weekdays, with the exception of 
Wednesdays when they closed at 3pm. This state sponsored de-regulation and re-
configuration of working time was a turning point for the Cyprus employment relations 
system, signifying a move to a more liberal economy. The government’s intention was that 
the additional working time would be covered by firms recruiting from the unemployed. At 
the same time, it must be stressed that the measure involved no compulsion on employers to 
recruit staff from the unemployed (Eurofound, 2015), leaving them considerable discretion 
regarding how the additional shifts from extended opening times were to be rostered. 
In each country, state and employer efforts to reorganise working time in food retail in the 
interests of the latter, are in the context of a highly restricted role for other actors in this 
regulatory space, particularly trade unions. Retail work is poorly unionised throughout the 
EU (Eurofound, 2016). Supermarket retail, unsurprisingly shares this characteristic. In the 
UK, there are high profile partnership agreements, such as in Tesco and its recognition of 
USDAW. This is the biggest private sector collective bargaining agreement in the UK, and 
one of the biggest in Europe (Blythman, 2005). The agreement covers issues such as pay 
structures, attendance, disciplines and work-life balance (Engage for success, 2012). Yet, 
Williams (2014, p.196) notes, ‘the partnership agenda ‘is to a large extent a reflection of trade 
union weakness’ and in the case of Tesco, the union was concerned that the company was 
contemplating de-recognition.  
In Cyprus, Katsourides (2013) reports general fall in union density as a result of aggressive 
employer strategies to union organization, especially during the recent recession. The 
outcome of lower density, according to Ioannou (2011), is that the unions have abandoned 
strikes as a tool to generate change. Therefore, as Katsourides (2013, p.21) reports: ‘trade 
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unions today are mostly perceived as organizations that offer services, rather than vehicles of 
struggle’. As Ioannou (2014, p.121) concludes, ‘the current crisis, exacerbated the already 
existing processes of labour market regulation, trade union decline and deterioration of 
employment relations’. Moreover, in retail, like the UK, Cyprus’s collective sectoral 
agreements covering working time are increasingly giving way to enterprise level decision-
making (Eurofound, 2016). 
The above summary illustrates how a central aspect of the employment relationship such as 
working time encompasses a variety of processes of social control (statutory and non-
statutory) and a multiplicity of competing actors operating at different levels (Martinez-Lucio 
and Mackenzie, 2004 and 2005). It reveals, however, how employers have had considerable 
scope to capture and unilaterally regulate essential areas of working time such as rostering 
and scheduling. This capture is because of the limited scope of statutes by the EU and 
national governments, and the weakness of other actors such as trade unions. Of concern is 
the degree to which this greater employer discretion and capture of working time at a time of 
recession further degrades employment conditions through allowing creating more precarious 
and fragmented forms of work. Moreover, the article seeks to understand how these changing 
patterns of working time are experienced by retail workers and the relevance, if at all, of EU 
and national statutory protections. 
Methodology  
This article draws on qualitative data from four case study organizations, two in the UK and 
two in Cyprus. This multiple international case study strategy allowed both the within-case, 
cross-case, as well as cross-national analysis. The selection of the cases aims for consistency 
of comparison on the organizational level, while the emphasis on deregulation across both 
countries allows a comparative cross-national analysis of how the regulatory regimes in the 
two countries, which emphasises on labour market flexibility and flexible working time 
practices, impact on the organizational level within the same sector.  
The case study organizations were selected based on their size and their market share in the 
local and the global market. The UK organizations are both leaders in the global and the UK 
food retail sector. UK1 is a British-grown multinational grocery retailer, whilst UK2 is a 
multinational company that holds a significant share of the UK market. Similarly, the Cyprus 
case study organizations are leaders in the country’s food-retail market. Cy2 is a world leader 
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grocery-retailer with presence in 33 countries, including Cyprus since 2005. On the other 
hand, Cy1 is a smaller ‘family-owned’ organization with only seven stores and approximately 
700 employees. Although this is a smaller organization, it is a developing company and is 
steadily increasing its market share. It is a leader in its region and is expanding its business to 
other areas of the island, becoming today the second biggest home-grown food retailer in the 
country.  The research in both organisations took place in 2013/4 in the period of austerity 
following the 2008 financial crisis. Cyprus at this time was facing particularly acute 
recessionary pressures.  
Qualitative research data were secured using semi-structured interviews with respondents in 
each of the case study organisations. The qualitative research involved 90 interviews across 
the two counties and specifically 44 in the UK and 46 in Cyprus. In the UK the interviews 
were conducted in English, whilst in Cyprus they were conducted in Greek and translated in 
English.  In total four stores were examined in the UK in the west of Scotland. One large 
store was examined for UK1, whereas three stores were explored for UK2. In Cyprus, three 
stores were examined in total, all located in the North east of the island. Two stores were 
examined for Cy1 (the head/store and store2, which is located in a tourist area), while one 
store was explored for Cy2. In each store the interviews were conducted with HR, senior and 
line managers, union representatives, and shop-floor employees, aiming to understand the 
different perspectives on the problem examined. Interviews lasted between 35-90 minutes 
and focused upon a number of key themes, including the nature of the work, the job process, 
the regulation and organization of working time and working time scheduling.  
The following data illustrates the consequences of employer capture of key areas of working 
time regulation. The data is organised around two substantive sections; the first covering the 
UK; and the second Cyprus. In each of these sections the data is themed by first identifying 
the competitive, economic and regulatory drivers of change in the retail grocery sectors of the 
two countries. This is then followed by an analysis of how management is using its capture of 
rostering and scheduling to introduce work practices and innovations designed to extract even 
greater flexibility from their workforces. Moreover, this section includes an analysis of the 
reactions of employees to such changes.  
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UK: (De) regulation, Employer Capture and new forms of fragmented 
working-time 
Intensified pressure for cost control resulting from the recent recession allied to changing 
consumption patterns were key drivers for management’s efforts to recast and reshape 
working time in the UK. The impact of the intensified cost pressures meant the UK grocery 
sector is characterized by fierce price competition amongst a small number of dominant 
players. The evidence from the two UK case studies confirms this cost focus.  As the store 
HR Manager in UK1 argued:  
‘Everything is driven by cost…it is a low cost business…everybody is 
predominantly driven by cost and sales’. (Store.HRM.UK1) 
In the same vein, one HR manager in UK2 discussed the financial pressures as a result of the 
recession and the increased competition, describing the lower cost strategy in the 
organization: 
‘Our culture has always been a better service, but because of the changes in the 
economy over the years, the challenge is to still get the best service but [with] 
lower costs, because UK2 [organizations name] is all about cost and you want to 
get the best possible price for the customer; but you really need to control your 
cost. So cost are tighter now than they ever were…I think, years ago it was about 
people and it was about how customers get serviced. It's still about that, but we 
have to do it in a more budgetary controlled way.’ (HRM2.UK2) 
Both organizations aggressively pursued policies to cut labour cost and introduce lean 
staffing. Attempts to reconfigure working time were at the heart of this approach, whereby 
the reconfiguration of working-time was predicated upon changes in the allocation of shift 
patterns and the emergence of new type of contracts.    
 At the same time, management also reported that there were changes in consumption 
patterns that demanded alterations in working time. The Regional HR manager in UK1 
commented: 
‘From a flexibility point of view, most supermarkets tend to have a high 
workforce of part-time workers. Full-time contracts are very rare….We need 
flexibility to respond to peaks and the changing nature of retail...Most  stores 
trade between 5pm and 9pm, far more than any other time during the day, which 
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is been a big change on retail. A lot of people do shop on the way home from 
work or during the night, so that’s probably changed quite a lot, that is where 
you need part-time workers.’ (Regional.HRM.UK1) 
The two UK organizations offered working contracts significantly shorter than the EU 
upper limit of 48 hours per week. These contracts were increasingly staffed using part-
time employees. Typical staff ratios across the two UK cases were 80% part-time, 20% 
percent full time. 
For employees, a central feature of this part-time work was the fragmentation of their 
working life into small blocks of paid work. The majority of employees, across both 
cases, particularly those on the front-line, were on 3.5 hours shifts, whilst the weekly 
working hours varied across the two organizations between 8-27 hours, depending on 
the contract type and the amount of overtime work. For example, an HR manager in 
UK1 commented: 
‘Not a lot of people are on full time, but we do have a lot of part time hours. On  
checkouts they do 3,5 hours shifts, but if there's overtime a colleague would pick 
up an extra shift on that…we have quite a few colleagues that work more than 
30 hours [through overtime]’ (HRM1.UK2) 
Part-time work was not the only method deployed by employers to control working time 
and cut costs. Employers further introduced other forms of ‘fragmented’ and highly 
flexible employment in the form of flexi-contracts. As will be shown, these flexi-
contracts provided management with considerable power to shape working time, and 
bring in new forms of employment degradation. 
Flexi-contracts and ‘forced availability’ 
UK1 introduced the ‘flexi-contract’ to more closely co-ordinate staffing levels with the 
exigencies of customer flow, while simultaneously managing cost pressures. Flexi-contracts 
were introduced to complement the increasing recruitment of young students who required 
flexibility in their working hours to match the demands of their university timetable. The 
contracts differ from zero-hour contracts (ZHCs) as the ‘flexi-employees’ were guaranteed 
minimum contracted hours that could be extended. Employees on flexi-contracts usually 
worked during busy periods on the shop floor, such as weekends, and covered night shifts. 
Employees could also be asked, typically at short notice, to work additional shifts in order to 
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cover emergency labour needs such as absence.  In essence, flexi-contracts firmly strengthen 
employer control over the allocation and organisation of working time, leaving the 
responsibility for allocating working time and shifts with line managers. As one line manager 
commented: 
“Shifts are always covered, there are no empty places or gaps…we've got the 
flexi-staff, so we flex them up where we need them to cover” (LM1.UK1)   
Employees on flexi-contracts were engaged under different terms and conditions and were 
required to undertake overtime and/or cover additional shifts. What differentiated the flexi-
contracts from these other more conventional working time arrangements and management – 
worker relations, was that it was mandatory for flexi-contract employees to accept overtime 
and extra shifts, as this was part of their written terms and conditions. By stipulating 
contractual compliance with such demands, employers were creating an environment of 
‘forced availability’ for employees.  One employee argued,   
‘They phone people to come in to help them for that day…and usually these 
are flexi contracts; they rely on them to help. [But] I'm thinking that I'm getting 
called in whenever they [managers] please and other [employees] don't need 
to.’(E8.UK1) 
Another flexi-employee commented:  
‘You have to be available and willing to do some [overtime]’. [For example] I 
worked all day on Friday and then I had to be at work for a full weekend and I 
don't like it, [but] it's not my choice (E14.UK1).  
The climate of ‘forced availability’ is further illustrated by employees on flexi-contracts 
being constrained in their ability to refuse overtime.  One argued:   
 “You are allowed to say no, they'll understand if you have maybe commitments 
or something but there is only so many times you can refuse because it is in your 
contract. It’s a flexi-contract so…you are sort of forced in a position that you have 
to do this, and a lot of time you have to work late. I don't want to work late ever, 
is not a good thing, it's not fun (E12.UK1)” 
The uncertain demands for extra working hours, generated feelings of frustration, unfairness 
and pressure for employees to be constantly available to work.  
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‘Most of the time she [the manager] would say, "Because you are flexi it is 
your duty…you need to work these [hours]". That's a bit of unfair. (E8.UK1)’ 
Similarly, another flexi-contracted employee described how additional shifts brought 
significant intensity to their working lives during busy periods such as Christmas: 
‘One time last year they put me on six in the morning for Christmas eve, I just 
worked up to 10pm the night before…and they want me to start 6am on 
Christmas eve to 3pm…it's unreasonable. Compared to any other contracts you 
are the one that you get phoned and told that you need to work and that's it done. 
I find it a bit not fair really; there are other types of contracts that don't need to 
do that so it can be unfair’. (E5.UK1) 
Another flexi-employee stated:  
‘I'm contracted to eight [hours] [but] usually I do up to eighteen at the 
weekend…people [on flexi-contracts] get shifts that they don't want [and] these 
are those that other people don't want. We are flexi, it's a different contract, 
[but] the shifts that we get are not great…is not fair if everybody is doing 
horrible shifts all the time…The system is a bit of annoying. You just don't 
want to and you know you have to. It can be irritating at times definitely…but 
you did sign the contract so there isn't a lot you can do…so you sort of forced 
in a position that you have to do this [and] this was increased dramatically 
(E9.UK1).’ 
The union representative also discussed the level of uncertainty regarding the working hours 
associated with the flexi-contract. She argued that the young employees often did not 
understand the contract they had signed until they experienced the pressure by managers to 
accept overtime and attend work. She emphasized the trade union’s disagreement with this 
scheme but at the same time she suggested that this was embedded within the working time 
arrangements in UK1: 
‘Oh flexi-contracts, they are just horrible…the young ones need them because 
they are in college but…you won't know the day before what your shift is 
going to be the next day. The union don't particularly like them but at the same 
time is part of UK1’s [company name] working strategy, so you have to go 
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with it. I still don't like them and I still don't agree with them’ 
(Union.Rep.UK1) 
Cyprus: Encouraging regulatory capture by the employer - The impact of 
post-recessionary ‘price wars’ and state intervention   
The Cyprus grocery market has faced dramatic changes in the past decade. The factors 
driving this change were largely due to competition and recession. Traditionally dominated 
by home-based grocers, overseas operators (e.g. Cy2 in 2005) have increasingly entered the 
market, including an international discount food retailer. These new entrants have generated 
pressures for cost cutting and lower product prices across the sector. The senior financial 
manager of Cy1 commented:  
‘The competition has changed. Since the international retailers invested in Cyprus 
we have seen a tremendous impact on our profitability, it dropped by 3% and this 
is massive. We constantly look for new and innovative ways to remain 
competitive, increase our profit margins and of course keep cost to the minimum. 
Today you have to be cheap to survive, lower cost is synonymous with our 
operations (SeniorManager.Cy1) 
This manager also discussed the influence of the aggressive price war in the market that had 
been exacerbated by recessionary pressures. Within this context of pressures to reduce costs, 
the financial line manager in Cy1 and store manager in Cy2 identified labour as a major 
source of savings to increase sales and profits for the supermarkets.  
“Labour cost is directly linked with your turnover. Lower cost means higher 
turnover...The head office knows at any point what your sales are and how much 
you spend on labour. They always argue that we spend too much on labour; it 
goes without saying that we have to keep an eye on our [labour] cost.” 
(StoreManager.Cy2) 
Recession also had its impact and cutting labour costs was key to how each organisations 
initially responded to this challenge through either redundancies or other measures. In Cy2, 
for example, the closure of departments, redundancies, and recruitment freezes were vital 
cost reduction measures to ensure organisational survival.   
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At the same time, changes in the configuration of working time were also key tactics utilized 
by both case study organizations to cut costs in this difficult environment. In Cy1 a manager 
illustrated this dual approach.   
“If I had the power I would definitely consider redundancies and more flexibility 
in staffing. There are two main shifts, the morning that starts at 7am and the 
afternoon one…Why do you need a full house at 7am in the morning? Get them 
on a split rotas and keep an on-call cohort of employees for your busy times in the 
afternoon. This would save you at least 10 people and would significantly reduce 
the cost. For me we are overstaffed at the moment, and this is not healthy for the 
business (LM5.Cy1). 
At the same time, these management aspirations to some degree faced barriers because of the 
aforementioned intervention by the state to reform the ‘Regulation of the operation of shops 
and the Employment Terms’. This reform stipulated that the extension of opening hours was 
to be filled by recruiting from the unemployed. However, there was no compulsion on firms 
to recruit unemployed workers. As a result Cypriot employers were able to use their freedom 
to manipulate working time at the enterprise level to cover the new shifts through more 
efficient use of their existing labour.    
Subsequently, in each case organisation new recruitment was kept to a minimum. Instead, to 
cover the new hours management in each company simply reduced the number of employees 
working on shifts and enhanced the support and cover from other departments in case of 
absences or unexpected peaks in customer demand. This change in working-time allocation 
intensified the work of some employees, generating pressure and feelings of frustration 
among the workforce. One employee commented: 
‘With the new opening hour regulations, the management was supposed to recruit 
new people to cover Wednesdays and Sundays. Instead though they just split the 
staff into shorter shifts, three girls in the morning, three in the noon shift and three 
in the afternoon/late shift [instead of five and/or six in each shift]. They did that in 
order not to recruit new staff, but we are pressured more, especially during the 
summer period (E9.Cy2).  
Informal ‘forced availability’  
Management’s response to the government’s measures also resulted in increased, often 
unwanted, working hours for existing employees. Employees in Cy2 remonstrated that the 
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increasing hours of work impacted on their personal life, and led to a sense of powerlessness. 
As a checkout operator commented: 
‘Last month I worked for three weeks without a day off…it’s ridiculous...We 
cannot have any time off. We are not robots. We always had a day off [but] now 
it’s impossible to get it, things have changed’ (E8.Cy2) 
Other measures (in Cy2) including moving all full-time staff to part-time contracts, and when 
recruiting mainly only hiring the latter. As with managers in the UK, the store manager 
suggested that the increase in part-time employees was a mechanism to reduce costs by being 
able to flex up and flex down.  
‘By having part-timers, you can increase or reduce their hours based on your 
needs and by reducing their hours you have a direct positive effect on the labour 
cost.’ (StoreManager.Cy2) 
This shift away from full-time to part-time work again had a significant impact on 
employees’ personal life. One employee in Cy2 (a single mother) commented: 
I’m working part time…I asked for a full-time contract but it was impossible to 
get it…they said they don’t do full-time contracts anymore. But the money are not 
enough. I get 500€ [monthly] and I spend 400€ for childcare. I used to do two jobs 
but now because of the baby [I only do one] (E11.Cy2) 
The above quote was a common response, particularly among participants with families and 
dependants.  
Cy 1 provided another example of ‘forced availability’ among our case studies, specifically in 
Store 2. This Store had always been open on a Sunday because of the seasonal nature of its 
opening times in a tourist area. Prior to the introduction of changes to the ‘Regulation of the 
operation of shops and the Employment Terms’, the Head Store supplied workers to cover 
the extra Sunday shifts in Store2. In addition, these additional Sunday shifts were voluntary 
for employees and they were paid overtime (double-time). Unsurprisingly, because of the 
additional income, there were always employees wanting to work these extra shifts.  
After the introduction of new opening hours, however, the Head Store no longer sent 
employees to cover the additional shifts because it was now also operating on Sundays. This 
forced the organisation to recruit new employees, as the government decree suggested. 
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However, these new employees were not hired in sufficient numbers to completely cover the 
new shifts. As a result, it became mandatory for the employees in Store2 to work on Sundays.  
Front-line employees in Cy1, in both stores, became reluctant to work on Sundays, because 
the company (illegally) no longer paid overtime for this shift. Nevertheless, the data 
illustrates that   it was no longer at the employees’ discretion whether they wanted to work 
the extra hours as managers were now forcing employees to cover the extra hours. One young 
checkout operator (HeadStore.Cy1) commented:  
‘Sunday is [now] a usual day’s payment and no one wants to work it anymore. We 
are forced now to attend on Sundays, because the Store manager got angry and 
she said that it’s mandatory for all employees to work on Sundays. End of the 
story.’ (E9.Cy1) 
Similarly a checkout operator in Store2 commented:  
‘Now that the Head store remains open it is compulsory for everyone to work on 
Sundays’ (E6.Cy1).  
There are some differences in this example of ‘forced availability’ compared to the UK. 
Specifically, in Cyprus there is no formal contractual obligation on employees to attend 
through a ‘flexi-contract’, rather it is enforced through informal management coercion.  
 In addition, it appeared that were limited opportunities to take break from this work pattern.  
‘They force us to work on Sundays. It is supposed to be every other week but I’ve 
been working for three Sundays in a row now, I’ve been working every day for 
the last three weeks without a day off’ (E9.Cy1).  
The above reference to working everyday was a common complaint, as well as being often 
called in to cover shifts on short notice.  
Interestingly managers referred to the EU working time directive and national employment 
legislation when discussing how the rotas were prepared, especially the provisions concerning 
maximum hours of work per week and rest periods between shifts. In practice, however, these 
regulations did not seem to be followed especially after the introduction of the new opening 
hours. A checkout manager acknowledged this issue: 
“We now have the new law and lots of issues on working hours for the staff. 
[According to the law] they have to have three free mornings and three free 
afternoons every week. This was the law [so far] and we had to prepare the rotas 
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based on this. Of course [now] this is not always followed. We are open seven 
days a week and it’s difficult to prepare the rotas you know. People have to work 
on Sundays, this is the new law, this is what we do now (LM3.Cy1)” 
Discussion  
This paper has explored the regulation of working time in the grocery retail sector in the UK 
and Cyprus following the 2008 financial crisis. The literature section highlighted how 
working-time in retail grocery is regulated by a multiplicity of different actors. At the level of 
the EU, regulations present in both countries curtail the maximum number of working hours 
an employee could work in a given week. Yet, in accordance with Martinez-Lucio’s and 
Mackenzie’s framework (2004 and 2005), the literature further suggested limitations to this 
statutory framework and highlighted the ways in which regulation can be captured and 
performed by other actors beyond the boundaries of the state, notably employers. In both 
country’s retail grocery sectors, employers at the enterprise level exercise increasing 
unilateral discretion other the rostering and scheduling of work. For the UK, this power held 
by employers has been assisted by the recent recession and a labour market characterized by 
extreme forms of flexible working practices such as ZHCs. In Cyprus, a more pluralistic 
approach to regulate working time was apparent, but increased competition, state reforms and 
the weakening of unions are establishing a more favourable environment for management to 
exercise their prerogative over working time.  
The consequences of this capture of aspects of working time regulation was then explored 
empirically across retail grocery stores in the UK and Cyprus. The data revealed similarity 
and difference in employer strategies and employee experiences.  Overall, in the UK the use 
of flexi-contracts illustrated the higher discretion available to management to regulate 
working time to meet their priorities. Managers use this tool for rostering and overtime in 
order meet customer flow and save costs. For employees, the requirements of ‘forced 
availability’, frustration, growing unpredictability, increased difficulties in managing work-
life balance were clear outcomes of these managerial regimes. The UK data in many ways 
paints a bleak picture, because commentators have called for the reform or abolition of ZHCs 
in favour of contractual conditions that guarantee at least some minimum hours (Adams and 
Deakin, 2014). Yet, this study has revealed how guarantees of working hours can ring hollow 
for employees under these regimes of forced availability, because it is management’s 
unilateral control over rostering these guaranteed hours that degrades their employment. The 
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research, as similarly reported by Cunningham and James (2016), and in line with the 
analysis of Mackenzie and Martinez-Lucio (2005), suggests that where the state withdraws or 
neglects part of a regulatory space in liberal market economies, in this case the UK and 
Cyprus, the consequences are employer capture and unilateral decision-making. MacKenzie 
and Martinez-Lucio (2005) argue that regulation exists at various levels and changes at one 
level impact upon others. This study evidences the re-configuration of regulatory roles and 
suggests regulatory transfer beyond the boundaries of the state, enhancing the position of the 
employer in the regulatory space of working time (Mackenzie and Martinez-Lucio, 2005, 
2014). This leads to even less autonomy and control of work for employees. The Cyprus 
cases highlighted how the recession and state intervention have pushed employers in retail to 
adopt harsh measures to reduce labour costs, with the capture and manipulation of rostering 
and attendance a key element in their strategies. Existing employees were subjected to 
forcible changes to their contractual status from full-time to part-time work, along with 
unpredictability regarding the timing and length of hours, cuts in income and, again, ‘forced 
availability’. Workers, in turn, reported increasing frustration, and a sense of powerlessness 
in the face of these changes. These cases also suggested the open flouting of EU and national 
regulations on length of the working week and rest breaks. Another disturbing finding from 
the Cyprus cases is the ability of employers to disregard changes in regulations designed to 
substantially decrease unemployment, in favour of sweating existing labour to save on costs. 
Some of these findings reflect concerns of other writers. Standing (1999, p.81), for example, 
argues, when the organizations call for employees to be flexible it usually means they are 
asked to make concessions. The concessions expected of employees in this case appear to be 
growing ‘schedule insecurity’, allied to the possibility of greater financial instability, and 
increasing difficulties in managing work-life balance (see Wood and Burchell, 2014). 
The phenomenon of ‘forced availability’ of employees raises new concerns and questions in 
the study of low paid work in the field of comparative, international human resource 
management (IHRM). Whether through formal contractual (UK) or informal, coercive 
management style (Cyprus) examples of ‘forced availability’ suggest  employers appear to 
increasingly have the ability to compel employees to attend work outside their normal 
working hours and at times considered unsocial, e.g. Sundays, with limited additional 
rewards. The size of the sample of organisations and numbers of workers interviewed leads 
us to be cautious about the generalizability of these findings. Moreover, the sometimes 
informal nature of such practices poses questions regarding their sustainability if there is a 
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considerable improvement in the respective labour markets at sector and national level. Yet 
the characteristics of these management practices and consequences on employee well-being 
mark them as a significant contribution from this study and suggest a need for further 
international research to understand how widespread these practices are and the full 
consequences for employees.   
In terms of the drivers of the phenomenon of forced availability, it is clear blame lies in 
intensified competition in grocery retail, the weakness of EU and state regulatory structures 
in not covering key areas of working time, as well as a lack of strong union representation.  
Yet we recognize that an absence or decline in influence of regulatory actors (e.g. the state or 
unions) does not preclude a reassertion of their role (Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie, 2004). 
It would be simple to identify the state as the key actor in this regard, as the results of this 
paper suggest the need for re-regulation of rostering and scheduling. Such statutory measures 
can perhaps include new individual workplace rights for employees to refuse ‘compulsory’ 
demands for attendance outside of normal working hours. However, the way employers 
(according to this study) are able in certain contexts to ignore national and EU regulations 
suggests industrial relations institutions/collective bargaining should also have a role in 
policing and improving on statutory provisions.  
Conclusions 
The theme of this special issue - ‘workplace regulation’ – prompted the use of Martinez-
Lucio’s and Mackenzie’s framework to explore tensions in the regulation of working time in 
the retail grocery sectors of Cyprus and the UK. In doing so, it highlights the capture of 
rostering and scheduling by employers at the enterprise level as a key characteristic of the 
regulation of this key aspect of the employment relationship. It further explores the 
consequences of this ‘capture’ empirically. In doing so, it reveals how the limits of EU, state 
and industrial relations regulation, coupled with recessionary and sectoral pressures have 
enabled employers to recast working-time to more meticulously match the exigencies of 
customer demand with lean staffing levels. The consequences include the phenomenon of 
‘forced availability’ which brings new concessions and insecurities among low paid and 
vulnerable workers. The article has further highlighted new avenues of concern and future 
research in the field of critical IHRM studies. In particular, the need to further research into 
‘compulsion’ in working time in different sectoral and international contexts. Finally, it 
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suggests the need for collective and individual solutions from all regulatory actors to protect 
vulnerable workers in retail grocery sector and beyond.  
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